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1THE EMERGING PROTOCOL :
A QUANTIFIED EVALUATION OF THE REGIME
by Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.   The Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is
developing and is fast approaching its final form1.   Briefing Paper No 252 examined how
well the emerging Protocol regime met the objectives set out in the mandate3 for the Ad Hoc
Group and compared the emerging regime and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
regime, which entered into force on 29 April 1997, against an  appropriate set of criteria.
2.  That analysis concluded that the Protocol declarations will be considerably less onerous
than those for the CWC as only tens of facilities will need to be declared in a typical
developed country such as those in Europe.  No commercial proprietary information (CPI)
will be required in declarations yet the facilities to be declared will be selected to be those of
particular relevance.    The provisions for ensuring the submission of declarations have no
parallel in the CWC regime and should be effective in ensuring that States Parties to the
Protocol comply with their obligations. The declaration follow-up procedures with infrequent
randomly-selected visits will ensure that declarations are complete and accurate with the
potential for extension of such visits to provide advice and technical cooperation providing a
useful bonus for States Parties. The declaration clarification procedures, commencing with
written correspondence through a consultative meeting to, if necessary, a clarification visit,
will ensure that declarations are complete and accurate.   Both of these are developments
from the CWC regime and should ensure that the Protocol regime is more reliable.
Investigations are always going to be highly political in nature and consequently extremely
rare events.   They are, however, vital elements of the overall regime.   The specific Protocol
provisions for implementation of Article X of the BTWC go far beyond the comparable
provisions in the CWC -- and will contribute both to the promotion of universality of the
Protocol and to the increasing of transparency and the building of confidence in compliance.
3.   It was concluded in Briefing paper No 25 that all in all, the BTWC Protocol is being
crafted so that it will achieve the requirement for an effective and reliable regime which, in
accordance with the AHG mandate, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation  of the BTWC and thereby strengthen the norm against biological weapons.
4.  In this Briefing Paper, the analysis in Briefing Paper No 25 is developed further by
examining how various aspects of the regime can be quantified.  As before, the CWC regime
                                                
1Graham S Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Overall Evaluation, Evaluation Paper No. 1,
University of Bradford, July 1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2Graham S Pearson & Malcolm R Dando, The Emerging Protocol: An Integrated Reliable and Effective
Regime, Briefing Paper No. 25, University of Bradford, September 1999.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/sbtwc
3United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, 19 - 30 September 1994, Geneva.
2is used for comparative purposes, as it is the regime that is of the closest relevance4 to the
emerging BTWC Protocol regime.
Approach to Quantification
5.   In considering the quantification of the BTWC Protocol regime, it is necessary to recap on
the overall appreciation of the regime and the probable size of the future BTWC Organization
to implement the Protocol.   Detailed analyses5 6 have led to the appreciation that the future
BTWC Organization would have a strength of about 200 and thus be less than half the size of
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).  The BTWC
Organization annual budget would be about $30 M -- about half that of the OPCW.
6.   Briefing Paper No 5 An Optimum Organization, issued in January 19987, made a detailed
analysis in Annex II (reproduced for ease of reference as an Annex to this Briefing Paper) of
the posts and functions in the OPCW which had been reviewed from the point of view of
assessing what was likely to be required for a lean and mean BTWC organization. Two key
assumptions underpinned the analysis:
a.   The numbers of visits and investigations made by the BTWC Organization would
be about 30% of the 300 to be carried out by the CWC i.e. about 100 a year and hence
the required number of staff to organise and carry out these visits and investigations
would be about 30% of the 303 OPCW posts in 1998 for CWC verification and
inspection.
b.   The numbers of declarations to be made to the BTWC organization were assumed
to be in the range from 1400 to 7000 (assuming 10 or 50 declarations per State Party)
and thus comparable to the numbers made to the OPCW.
Any posts that were unlikely to have a direct analogue in the BTWC regime, such as the
chemical demilitarization branch or specific CW related posts had been deleted, and the
numbers of other posts reduced to reflect the reduced number of inspectors which, following
a detailed analysis of the OPCW planned inspections for 1998, had been assessed as being
about a third of those in the OPCW.
7.  The outcome of that analysis gave the following broad indications for the number of posts
needed for a future BTWC Organization:
                                                
4Graham S Pearson & Malcolm R Dando, The Emerging Protocol: An Integrated Reliable and Effective
Regime, Briefing Paper No. 25, University of Bradford, September 1999, pp. 4 - 5. Available on http://www.
brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
5Graham S Pearson, An Optimum Organization, Briefing Paper No. 5, University of Bradford, January 1998.
Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
6Federation of American Scientists Working Group on BW Verification, The Structure and Cost of a BWC
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7Graham S Pearson, An Optimum Organization, Briefing Paper No. 5, University of Bradford, January 1998.
Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
3Division BTWC
Organization
OPCW
Director-General
(Security, Health & Safety, Legal Adviser, Internal
Oversight, Secretariat for Policy Making Organs)
42 85
Administration
(Budget, Human Resources, Information Systems, Travel,
Training)
32 77
External Relations 10 15
International Cooperation & Assistance 10 11
Compliance Monitoring
(Declarations, Information Processing, Validation,
Evaluation and Confidentiality, Organization Laboratory)
44 66
Visits & Investigations (Number of inspectors) 70 237
OVERALL TOTAL 208 491
In order to facilitate comparison with the OPCW, external relations and international
cooperation were shown as separate divisions and the corresponding OPCW numbers in 1998
were included for comparison.
8.  The two years since Briefing paper No 5 have seen a significant increase in the experience
of the OPCW which has now been in existence for over two and a half years.  Although the
strength of the OPCW has increased by 16 from 491 to 507, the distribution of these posts8
amongst the functions of the OPCW is similar to that used in the previous analysis.  In
addition, there have been a number of developments in the BTWC Protocol. It is
consequently both timely and necessary to re-examine what implications the experience of the
past couple of years have for the operation, strength and budget of the future Organization.
The CWC Regime
9.  The CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997.  When Briefing Paper No 5 was
distributed, the OPCW had had less than 9 months experience of implementing the CWC
with its then  106 States Parties.   Now, at the end of 1999, the number of States Parties has
risen to 126 and the OPCW has had two and a half years experience in implementing the
CWC.   As might be expected, there have been developments in the CWC regime and earlier
estimates can now be refined.
10.  As in the previous analysis9, attention is focussed in this analysis on the OPCW
inspection regime for activities not prohibited under Article VI of the CWC, ie the non-CW
facilities:  the regime for facilities related to Schedule 1 chemicals, Schedule 2 chemicals,
Schedule 3 chemicals and unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (DOCs) and unscheduled
DOCs containing the elements phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine (PSF).  The CWC
requirements for Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and DOC facilities require these to be declared if the
quantities of chemicals exceed a specified threshold -- these are thus declarable facilities.
                                                
8Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 2000,  Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-II/DEC.23, 2 July 1999, p. 4.
9Graham S Pearson, An Optimum Organization, Briefing Paper No. 5, University of Bradford, January 1998.
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4The declared facility is subject to routine inspection if the quantities exceed a second, higher
threshold -- these are thus inspectable facilities.  The OPCW 1998 Annual Report10 provides
the following figures for 31 December 1998:
Data on 31 December 1998 Schedule 2 Schedule 3 DOC
Declared plant sites 297 395 3,506
Inspectable plant sites 119 329 3,314
The Annual Report notes that the number of declared plant sites remained below the numbers
assumed for the 1998 OPCW Budget   The report states that "Some States Parties believe
that...outstanding and incomplete declarations could be identified as the main sources of
considerable discrepancies between the assumed and actually declared figures."  This
appears likely as elsewhere in the Annual Report 1998 it is recorded that "Thirty-five of 121
States Parties had still not submitted initial declarations by 31 December [1998]."  and it is
widely known that the United States is one of the States Parties that has yet to make its initial
declarations in respect of industrial chemical sites.
11.  The CWC inspection requirements11 can usefully be summarized together with the
numbers of inspectable facilities:
Facility Type Estimated
declarable
number
(1998
Budget12)
Declared
inspectable
number
(1998
Report13)
Assumed
inspectable
number
(2000
Budget14)
Inspection
duration
Number
inspected
per year
per plant
site
Number
inpected
per year
per State Party
Schedule 1
chemicals
40 24 35 As required Not limited Not limited
Schedule 2
chemicals
400 119 178 96 hours* 2 Not limited
Schedule 3
chemicals
500 329 429 24 hours* 2 3 + 5% sites≤ 20
DOCs/PSFs 6 - 15,000 3,314 5,500 24 hours* 2 3 + 5% sites≤ 20
* As specified in the Convention.  Extensions may be agreed between the inspection team
and the inspected State Party.
The number of inspections per year per State Party for plant sites producing Schedule 3
chemicals or DOCs is a combined limit.  The Convention states in respect of Schedule 3 plant
sites that "the combined number of inspections shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the
total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part VIII of
                                                
10Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annual Report 1998.
11United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Corrected version in accordance with Depositary Notification
C.N.246.1994.Treaties-5 and the corresponding Proces-Verbal of Rectification of the Original of the
Convention, issued on 8 April 1994.   Available at http://www.opcw.nl/cwc/cwc-eng.htm
12Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 1998,  Second Session, 1 - 5 December 1997, C-II/6, 6 December 1997.
13Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Annual Report 1998.
14Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 2000,  Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-II/DEC.23, 2 July 1999.
5this Annex [the part relating to DOCs], or 20 inspections, whichever of these two figures is
the lower."   Consequently, for a State Party with a combined total of Schedule 3 and DOCs
plant sites of 20, the limit would be a total of  3 + 5% of 20 = 4 inspections.   If it had a
combined total of 100 such plant sites, the limit would be 3 + 5% of 100 = 8 inspections.  It is
noted that the combined ceiling of 20 visits for Schedule 3 and DOCs plant sites will only
come into effect when the State Party has in excess of 340 Schedule 3 and DOC plant sites.
12.  It needs to be emphasised that the CWC requirement is for the declaration of plant sites
that comprise one or more plants which produced, processed or consumed Schedule 2
chemicals  or produced Schedule 3 chemicals or DOCs.   Consequently, a single plant site
may have a number of plants within it.  The routine inspections are to plant sites. The
multiplicity of plants within plant sites is clearly illustrated by information published15 by the
United Kingdom National Authority:
Number of UK Declarations under the CWC
CWC Category Sites Plants
Schedule 1 2 2
Schedule 2 9 9
Schedule 3 11 16
Discrete Organic Chemicals 132 550
Total 154 577
Note:  A site classified under more than one category is counted only once
13.   The numbers of inspections under Article VI Activities Not Prohibited Under This
Convention planned16 by the OPCW for 1999 and 2000 are as follows:
Facility/Plant Site Expected number
of inspections
in 1999
Anticipated
inspectable sites
as of 31 Dec 1999
Planned number
of inspections
for 2000
Intensity*
(%)
in 2000
Schedule 1
SSSF 7 7 7 100
Other 10 28 18 64
Total Schedule 1 17 35 25 70
Schedule 2
Initial 49 57 57 100
Routine 3 121 10 8
Total Schedule 2 52 178 67 38
Schedule 3 7 429 34 8
DOC/PSF 0 † 5500 6 0.1
Overall Total 76 -- 132 --
                                                
15Department of Trade and Industry, 1997 Annual Report on the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, DTI, February 1998.
16Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 2000,  Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-II/DEC.23, 2 July 1999.
6Notes
* Intensity is calculated by dividing the number of inspections by the number of
inspectable sites and multiplying by 100.
†The Convention specifies that inspections of DOC/PSF plant sites shall start at the
beginning of the fourth year after entry into force -- they therefore start in May 2000.
14.   The different priorities assigned to Schedule 1, Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and DOC
facilities reflect the different risks to the Convention.  As was noted in Briefing Paper No
1117, for the purposes of the Article VI declarations, the CWC Annex on Chemicals sets out
three schedules, which together list 43 species or families of chemical: 12 in Schedule 1
(including saxitoxin and ricin, as well as blister and nerve gases and intermediates thereof),
14 in Schedule 2, and 17 in Schedule 3 (including hydrogen cyanide, which as a toxic agent
of biological origin is a toxin within the meaning of the Biological Weapons Convention).  Of
the 43, 27 are precursors and 16 are toxicants.  Each of the chemicals has been scheduled
because it is deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, the chemicals
in Schedule 1 a ÒhighÓ  risk, and those in Schedule 2 a ÒsignificantÓ  risk.  The scheduling
also reflects the degree of industrial application of the listed chemicals, those in Schedule 3
being ones Òproduced in large commercial quantitiesÓ and those in Schedule 1 Òhaving
little or no use for purposes not prohibited under this ConventionÓ.  The three schedules are
in fact negotiated lists, though criteria for adding new chemicals to them, or removing
existing ones, are also specified in the Annex on Chemicals.  Two categories of declaration
are triggered by each schedule, one having to do with the chemicals per se, the other with
facilities associated with them.  The amount of detail required is greatest for Schedule 1 and
smallest for Schedule 3, this reflecting the differing stringency of the control regime
associated with each schedule.  The facilities to be declared are ones in which more than
threshold quantities of the chemicals are produced or, for chemicals on Schedules 1 and 2,
processed or consumed.  The facility declarations also extend, with certain exemptions, to
plant sites where Òunscheduled discrete organic chemicalsÓ  are Òproduced by synthesisÓ
in more than threshold quantities.
15.  The OPCW has understandably and rightly concentrated its efforts on the inspections
relating to the declaration of chemical weapons, of CW production facilities and CW
destruction facilities.  The remaining effort has been used to carry out Article VI inspections
with priority being given to Schedule 1 facilities, then to Schedule 2 facilities and then to
Schedule 3 facilities.  DOC facilities have the least priority as the Convention makes it clear
than inspections will not start until the Convention has been in force for three years ie starting
in May 2000.
16.  The resources needed to carry out these inspections can be examined, first on the basis of
the assumptions used for the 1998 OPCW Budget and then from the data for the actual
inspections in 1998.   The assumptions used for the 1998 OPCW Budget18 were as follows:
                                                
17J P Perry Robinson, The CWC Verification Regime:  Implications for the Biotechnological & Pharmaceutical
Industry, Briefing Paper No. 11, University of Bradford, July 1998. Available on
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
18Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 1998,  Second Session, 1 - 5 December 1997, C-II/6, 6 December 1997.
7Plant site Inspection team
size
Time on site for
inspection
Inspection cycle
(initial planning
to final report)
Inspection frequency
Schedule 1 3 - 4 48 hours 15 days average 0.5/year average
Schedule 2 5 96 hours* 17 days average 1 in 3 years average
Schedule 3 5 24 hours* 14 days average Limited
* As specified in the Convention.  Extensions may be agreed between the inspection
team and the inspected State Party.
17.  The actual resources reported in the 1998 Annual Report are:
Type of Plant Site Number of Inspections Number of Plant Sites Inspector-days*
Schedule 1 13 13 224
Schedule 2 68 68 2,329
Schedule 3 13 13 240
* Inspector-days are the days spent by the inspector away from the OPCW i.e. the 
number of days from leaving the OPCW until arriving back at the OPCW.
The average number of inspector-days per inspection can then be calculated as:
Type of Plant Site Average inspector-
days per inspection
Days per inspector per
inspection assuming
4 inspectors
Schedule 1 17.2 4.3
Schedule 2 34.2 8.5
Schedule 3 18.5 4.6
18.  These figures correspond approximately to 4 inspectors travelling for a day, then
spending 2, 4 or 2 days at a Schedule 1, 2 or 3 plant site respectively followed by a further
day travelling back to the OPCW.  In respect of routine inspections at Schedule 3 facilities,
the actual duration at the site is about two days as the specified period of inspection of 24
hours begins after the pre-inspection briefing and, frequently, a site tour.
19.  The budgeted inspections of Schedule 1, 2, 3 and DOCs have increased gradually over
the last three years and according to the OPCW Mid Term Plan19 are assumed to remain
constant over the next few years at a total of 132 inspections (out of the total of some 300
inspections of all types conducted annually) although the number for Schedule 3 and DOCs
will increase by 9 and 6 respectively in 2001 whilst the number of Schedule 2 inspections will
decrease by 15:
                                                
19Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Draft Medium-Term
Plan 2000 - 2003, Fourth Session, 28 June - 2 July 1999, C-IV/DEC/CRP.32, 2 July 1999.  Annex 2
Background for Projections for Industry Related Inspections for 2000 - 2003.
8Plant site 1998 199920 2000 2001
Schedule 1 30 17 25 25
Schedule 2 68 88 67 52
Schedule 3 4 7 34 43
DOC -- -- 6 12
Total 102 112 132 132
20.  Using these numbers of inspections for 2001 and assuming that the numbers of
inspectable facilities remain the same as for 31 December 1999, intensities can be calculated
for 2001:
Plant site type Inspectable facilities Number of inspections Intensity
(%)
Schedule 1
SSSF 7 7 100
Other 28 18 64
Total Schedule 1 35 25 70
Schedule 2 178 52 29
Schedule 3 429 43 10
DOCs 5500 12 0.22
The combined intensity for Schedule 3 and DOCs is about 0.9 % -- well below the limit
figure of 5%.
21.  The overall proportion of the OPCW inspection effort on Article VI related inspections
can be deduced from the cost figures
Article VI Category Total costs, 2000
Schedule 1 1.308 M NLG
Schedule 2 4.837 M NLG
Schedule 3 2.283 M NLG
DOCs 0.412 M NLG
Sub-total 8.84 M NLG
As a proportion of the total cost in 2000 of the inspection programme of 41.861M, this
corresponds to about 21% very similar to the 22% calculated in Briefing Paper No 5 using the
inspector-days figures in the OPCW 1998 Budget.   As was argued in Briefing Paper No 5,
the OPCW priority has to be given, and rightly so, to the chemical weapons related activities.
When the chemical weapons have essentially been destroyed and chemical weapon
production facilities also destroyed, the number of inspections of the Article VI related
facilities can be expected to increase.
22.  As in previous years, no specific provision is made for the carrying out of challenge
inspections or inspections of alleged use as it is assumed that should such a requirement arise
then the inspectorate resources would be redeployed as necessary to carry out such an
activity.  The past year has seen OPCW practice challenge inspections in the UK at a military
                                                
20Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 1999,  Third Session, 16-20 November 1998, C-III/DEC.16, 23 November 1997.
9facility and of  a mock challenge inspection in Brazil at a commercial plant site21.   In
addition, a comprehensive exercise to test the OPCW procedures for allegations of use and
provision of technical assistance has been carried out in the Czech Republic.   This involved
an OPCW team of some 24 inspectors.
23. Analysis.   The OPCW experience has shown that 132 inspections under Article VI
Activities Not Prohibited Under This Convention of the CWC are carried out annually by the
OPCW.  The on-site durations are specified in the CWC for Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and DOC
facilities as not exceeding 96 hours, 24 hours and 24 hours respectively.   However, in
practice the time at Schedule 3 sites is about two days.  There is no duration limit for
Schedule 1 facilities.  These routine inspections are carried out at different frequencies which
are highest for Schedule 1 facilities and least for DOC production facilities.   Consequently,
the intensity of inspection, calculated as the number of inspections divided by the number of
inspectable sites, varies from 70% for 35 Schedule 1 facilities through 30% for 178 Schedule
2, 10% for 429 Schedule 3 to around 0.2% for 5500 DOC facilities.
24.   The OPCW regime currently extends to over 6,100 inspectable facilities.   The numbers
of declarations are significantly higher as plants within a plant site have to be declared.   The
UK declaration is for 577 plants at 157 plant sites.   It is recalled that the OPCW 1998 Annual
Report that the OPCW Annual Report 199822 in its account of inspections carried out at
Schedule 1, Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 facilities noted that the need for amended
declarations was the main issue identified as requiring further attention.23  It is also noted that
the UK have also reported24 that "The feedback from industrial sites...inspected by the OPCW
in 1998 has highlighted the fact that their initial concerns about commercial confidentiality
were unfounded."   Finally, it is noted that there is a serious shortfall in the declarations by
States Parties to the OPCW:  the 1998 OPCW Annual Report noted that "Thirty-five of 121
States Parties had still not submitted initial declarations by 31 December [1998]."  and the
Director-General has commented25 on the continuing absence of an industry declaration from
the USA noting that "this State party is the only major industrial country which has not yet
made such a declaration..."
The BTWC Protocol Regime   
25.   The draft Protocol has been considerably elaborated over the past two years since
Briefing Paper No 5 was prepared.    It is appropriate to examine the current situation26 in
November 1999 regarding the emerging regime and consider the nature of the developments
since October 1997.
                                                
21Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Statement by the Director-General of the OPCW,
United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, 19 October 1999.  Available at http://www.opcw.nl/
dgspeech.htm
22Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW Annual Report 1998.
23Graham S. Pearson, Visits: The Emerging Portfolio, Briefing Paper No. 26, University of Bradford, November
1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
24Department of Trade and Industry, 1998 Annual Report on the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996
by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, DTI Pub 3981, April 1999.
25Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Statement by the Director-General of the OPCW,
United Nations General Assembly, First Committee, 19 October 1999.  Available at http://www.opcw.nl/
dgspeech.htm
26United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/47 (Part I), 15 October 1999, Geneva.
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26.  The draft Protocol of October 199727 -- some 240 pages -- contained all the basic
concepts that have subsequently been developed and elaborated by the Ad Hoc Group.   There
is now much more detail in the latest version of the Protocol28 and in many Articles the
numbers of square brackets has reduced significantly.   One such Article is Article IX The
Organization which now contains provisions for:
A. General Provisions
B. The Conference of The States Parties
C. The Executive Council
D. The Technical Secretariat
E.  Privileges and Immunities
27.  These provisions are now written in more general terms than the earlier provisions, such
as in Annex H in the October 1997 rolling text, which were over-detailed.   The current text
for the Technical Secretariat states that:
(D) THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
[35. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this
Protocol. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive
Council in the performance of their functions.  It shall carry out the functions
entrusted to it by this Protocol, as well as those functions delegated to it by the
Conference or the Executive Council in accordance with this Protocol.
36. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to Article III and Annexes
... shall  include, inter alia:
(a) Receiving and processing of declarations submitted by the States Parties to the
Organization in accordance with the provisions of Article III, section D;
[(b) Receiving, [collecting,] processing, analyzing and storing data and all relevant
information relating to the appearance of unusual outbreaks of diseases or epidemics
supplied by States Parties and relevant international organizations.   [Such functions
shall be discharged by the International Epidemiological network, an integral part of
the Technical Secretariat];]
[(c) Supplying, at the request of the Organization or any State Party, any relevant
information drawn up on the basis of collected and processed data, inter alia, to help
distinguish outbreaks of diseases and epidemics deemed to have a natural cause from
outbreaks of diseases and epidemics which might be the result of a violation or
attempted violation of the Convention. [Such functions shall be discharged by the
International Epidemiological network, an integral part of the Technical
Secretariat];]
                                                
27United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/38, 6 October 1997, Geneva.
28United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/47 (Part I), 15 October 1999, Geneva.
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(d) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation, clarification and
cooperation among States Parties;
[(e)Processing requests for visits, carrying out the preparations for, providing
technical support during the conduct of, and conducting visits in accordance with the
provisions of Article III, section D, and of Annex B, and reporting the outcome to the
Executive Council;]
(f) Receiving requests for investigations to address non-compliance concerns, making
technical evaluation of these requests, submitting the requests to the Executive
Council for consideration, carrying out the preparations for, providing technical
support during the conduct of, and conducting investigations in accordance with the
provisions of Article III, section G, and of  Annex D, and reporting the outcome to the
Executive Council;
(g) Maintaining and updating a list of ad hoc experts and notifying all States Parties
of any additions to or alterations in the list in accordance with paragraphs 11 to 16 of
Annex D, Section 1;
[(h) Negotiating and concluding on behalf of the Organization, subject to the prior
authorization of the Executive Council, agreements and arrangements, as
appropriate, between the Organization and States Parties, other States and
international organizations;]
(i) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other matters
relating to the implementation of this Protocol.
28.  The principal elements of the draft Protocol are:
a.  Mandatory Declarations and Notifications (Article III D Declarations I.
Submission of Declarations)
b.  Follow-Up After Submission of Declarations which includes a package of
randomly-selected visits, declaration clarification procedures and voluntary assistance
visits. (Article III D Declarations II. Follow-Up After Submission of Declarations)
c.  Investigations -- both field and facility investigations (Article III G Investigations)
d.  Scientific and Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical
Cooperation (Article VII)
The resource implications, and the extent to which these have changed over the past two
years, will be considered in turn for each of these.
29.   Declarations.  The current requirements for initial and annual declarations as well as for
notifications are for the following categories:
Initial Declarations
(A)  Past Offensive and/or Defensive [Programmes][Activities]
12
[(B)  National Legislation and Regulations
Annual Declarations
(C) Current Defensive [Programmes][Activities]
(D) Vaccine Production Facilities
(E) Maximum Biological Containment (BL-4 - WHO [and OIE]
Classification) Facilities
[(F) High Biological Containment (BL-3 - WHO [and OIE] Classification)
Facilities
[(G) Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins]
[(H) Other Production Facilities]
[(I) Other Facilities
[(J) Transfers
[(K) Declarations on the Implementation of Article X of the Convention
[Notifications]
[(L) Outbreaks of Disease]
[(M) Current Exceeding of Threshold
30.  The estimates of the number of declarable facilities per State Party continue to be of the
order of tens of facilities for a developed European country based on the surveys reported in
various Working Papers submitted to the Ad Hoc Group.   The information provided in
Briefing Paper No 2029 in April 1999 is reproduced here for ease of reference.   It was
recalled that the architecture of the declaration requirements is designed to ensure that the
most relevant facilities are declared and not all possible facilities.   A number of surveys of
national microbiological activities have been reported to the AHG.  The results for Canada30,
the Netherlands31, United Kingdom32, Italy33 and the five Nordic Countries34 can be
summarised as follows:
Trigger used Canada Netherlands UK Italy Nordic
Military biodefence Yes Yes - Yes Yes
Biocontainment + other BL 4 + other BL 4 + other
Listed agents Not alone Not alone Not alone + other Yes
                                                
29Graham S. Pearson, Visits: An Essential Portfolio, Briefing Paper No. 20, University of Bradford, April 1999.
Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
30Canada, Discussion Paper on Declarations:  List of Agents and Combinations of Criteria,   BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/WP. 6, 28 November 1995.
31The Netherlands, The Relevance and Effectiveness of (Combinations of) Criteria for Declaration,  BWC/AD
HOC GROUP/WP.10, 28 November 1995.
32United Kingdom, Survey of Microbiological Facilities in the UK,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 81, 23 July
1996.
33Italy, National Survey in the Microbiological Activities,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 146, 18 March 1997.
34Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, Results of a Facility Declaration Trial in the Five Nordic
Countries,  BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP. 173, 18 July 1997.
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Genetic modification Not alone Not alone Not alone Not alone Yes
Production microbiology Yes + listed agents
+ biocontain
Not alone + listed agents + other
Aerobiology + other + listed agents
+ biocontain
- + listed agents + other
Most of the surveys give an indication of the number of facilities which would need to be
declared if certain triggers, or combinations of triggers, were to be used to capture those
facilities of most relevance to the Convention.   In these surveys, the triggers or combinations
used generally included military biodefence and BL 4 containment as stand alone triggers and
production microbiology in combination with work on listed agents as one of several
combined triggers.  The numbers to be declared if triggers such as these were to be used can
be summarised  as:
Canada Netherlands UK Italy 5 Nordic
Countries
Number of facilities to be
declared
30 to 50 [Tens] [Tens]* 40 50
* Based on recent discussions with the delegation.
The  broad conclusion that emerges is that the number of facilities in each country that would
need to be declared under triggers chosen to capture those facilities of most relevance to the
Convention would be relatively limited with numbers of the order of 10s in each country.
More recently, the Austrian/UK contribution35 to the EU seminar for the pharmaceutical
industry on 13 May 1998 said that "the number of facilities in individual EU countries that
would need to be declared can probably be measured in tens rather than hundreds."    It is
clear that numbers in the 10s are being considered for most European countries and this has
been confirmed in recent discussions with delegations.
31.  The estimated total number of facilities to be declared thus continues to be as assessed in
Briefing Paper No 1836 in January 1999 which reported a figure of the order of 1600 to 3200
assuming a figure of 10 to 20 facilities is taken as the average for 160 States Parties37.    This
total is comparable to the number of 2500 facilities estimated by others.38
32.  Follow-Up After Submission of Declarations.  The draft protocol now contains
provisions for a portfolio of measures, including randomly-selected visits, declaration
clarification procedures and voluntary assistance visits, aimed at ensuring that declarations
are complete and accurate.
33. The draft Protocol in Article III D. Declarations II Follow-Up after Submission of
Declarations in paragraph 5 entitled  Visit schedule states that:
                                                
35Austria and the United Kingdom, Industry and Declarations,  UK Presidency and the European Commission:
The BWC and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 May 1998.
36Graham S. Pearson, Visits: An Essential and Effective Pillar,  Briefing Paper No. 18, University of Bradford,
January 1999.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
37Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Integrated Regime, Briefing Paper No. 10,
University of Bradford, July 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
38Working Group on BW Verification, Estimate of the Number of Declared Facilities, Federation of American
Scientists, September 1997.  Available at http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/facilities.htm
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"The total number of all visits ... should not exceed [30][75][140][...] in each
calendar year.   At the end of each year, the Director-General should prepare a visits
schedule for the following year which shall make initial provision for [the conduct of
... [randomly-selected visits][transparency visits], ... voluntary assistance visits and
... [[voluntary] clarification visits]] [two-thirds of the total to be allocated to
[randomly-selected visits][transparency visits] and one-third to be allocated to other
visits pursuant to this Article]."
34. For each of the individual categories of visits, the draft Protocol has language concerning
the duration and the size of the inspection team:
a.  Randomly-selected visits.   The duration is specified in paragraph 18 in that
"[Randomly-selected visits][Transparency visits] may last for up to two [consecutive
working] days." with provision for this to be extended if the visited State Party and
the visiting team so agree.   In addition, "if so requested by the State Party to be
visited, the visit may be extended by up to [1][3] days for the visiting team to provide
technical advice or information, [or implement technical assistance and cooperation
activities or programmes as specified in Article VII, Section D, paragraph 17,]
requested by the State Party to be visited."
Insofar as team size is concerned "The Director-General shall limit the team size of
the visiting team to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the mandate.
In any event the team shall not exceed four members."
b.  Declaration Clarification Procedures.  Should these reach the stage of a
[Voluntary][Clarification] Visit then the duration provision states that "The inviting
State Party and the Director-General shall determine the duration of the visit, but in
no case shall the duration exceed two days."
Insofar as team size is concerned, the language is identical to that for randomly-
selected visits and states that "The Director-General shall limit the team size of the
visiting team to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the mandate.  In
any event the team shall not exceed four members."
c.  Voluntary Assistance Visits.   The team size and duration are left to the Director-
General and the State Party to be visited to agree:  "The detailed arrangements for,
and contents of, a voluntary visit, such as size and composition of the visiting team,
duration of the visit...shall be agreed beforehand by the Director-General and the
State Party to be visited."
35.  A detailed analysis39 of randomly-selected visits has concluded that it would be logical
for the different categories of declared facility in the Protocol regime to have a different
frequency for randomly-selected visits reflecting the potential risk to the Convention.   As
with the CWC regime where converted chemical weapon production facilities and the
Schedule 1 chemical facilities -- which are generally chemical defence facilities -- receive
more frequent inspections, there would be logic in converted past BW facilities which still
remain in government ownership and biodefence facilities being subject to a higher frequency
                                                
39Graham S. Pearson, Visits: The Emerging Portfolio, Briefing Paper No. 26, University of Bradford, November
1999.    Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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of randomly-selected visits.40  The maximum (BL4) and high (BL3) containment facilities
could have the least frequent visits as such facilities are generally subject to intensive national
health and safety inspections; it is also well known that containment is not a prerequisite for a
prohibited programme and consequently there is no logic requiring high containment facilities
to be more frequently inspected by the BTWC Organization.  Although the triggers for
declarations under the Protocol have not been finalised, a possible listing in order of
frequency of randomly-selected visits can be drawn up:
Category of Facility Frequency of randomly-selected visits
Converted past BW facilities in government ownership Most frequent
Current Defensive Programmes/ Activities Most frequent
Vaccine Production Facilities More frequent
Other Production Facilities More frequent
Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins Less frequent
Other Facilities Less frequent
High Biological Containment (BL-3) Facilities Least frequent
Maximum Biological Containment (BL-4) Facilities Least frequent
Although four different frequencies are indicated, it is noted that this could be simplified into
three frequencies by merging the middle two frequencies (more and less frequent) into a
single intermediate frequency.   It needs to be emphasised, however, that all categories of
declared facilities should receive randomly-selected visits as this promotes complete and
accurate declarations for all facilities.
36.  Investigations.   The draft Protocol rightly leaves the size of the investigation team to the
Director-General to determine taking into account the circumstances of the particular request:
"The Director-General shall determine the size of the investigation team and select the
proper qualified members to conduct the specific type of investigation requested in the
investigation request ... taking into account the circumstances of the particular request."
37.  There is, however, alternative square bracketed language which could put a ceiling on the
investigation team:  "The size of the investigating team shall be kept to the minimum
necessary for the proper fulfilment of the mandate[, but shall not in any event exceed ...
persons in cases of field investigations and ... persons in cases of facility investigations.]."
Such limits would be unfortunate as it would remove the flexibility that needs to be
maintained to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the new regime.  It needs to
be recalled that investigations are the crucial measure available to address non-compliance
concerns and it would be imprudent if this vital measure were to unnecessarily impaired.
38.  Scientific and Technical Cooperation.   Article VII has been considerably developed
and contains detailed provisions for the establishment of a Cooperation Committee as well as
elaborating a number of activities which should be carried out by the Technical Secretariat.
                                                
40Graham S. Pearson, The Ad Hoc Group:  Past Biological Weapons Facilities, in Erhard Geissler et al (eds),
Conversion of Past BTW Facilities, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1998.   Graham S. Pearson, Past
Biological Weapons Facilities: An Opportunity for the Ad Hoc Group, ASA Newsletter 97-6, 4 December 1997,
p.1, 16-17.  Graham S. Pearson, The Strengthened BTWC Protocol: An Integrated Regime, University of
Bradford, Briefing Paper No. 10, July 1998.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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The requirements placed on the Technical Secretariat are extensive and are currently41 the
following:
Role of the Technical Secretariat
17. The Director-General, assisted by the Technical Secretariat, shall promote and
facilitate scientific and technical cooperation and exchange among States Parties and
shall develop a framework of programmes and activities, taking into account any
recommendations of the Cooperation Committee in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs [9], [12] and [28], and implement the decisions of the [Conference of
States Parties] [Executive Council]. The Technical Secretariat shall, in accordance
with paragraphs ..., where appropriate:
[(a) Promote and finance the establishment of vaccine production facilities,
particularly in developing countries [which are States Parties];]
[(a) bis Provide advice and identify possible sources of financial and technical
assistance for the establishment and operation of collaborative vaccine
research and development programmes, and on the requirements for vaccine
production facilities meeting current Good Manufacturing Practice
standards;]
(b) Establish and maintain a network to facilitate contact and
communications, using the available electronic systems between States
Parties, other relevant international organizations and the Technical
Secretariat, for the purposes of enabling and promoting scientific cooperation
and exchange among States Parties;
(c) Convene regional or international seminars with a view to optimizing
cooperation on the peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins;
[(d) Develop a framework for donor countries [, including a voluntary fund,]
to support an international system for the global monitoring of emerging
diseases in humans, animals and plants, and to support, other specific
programmes to improve the effectiveness of national and international efforts
on the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of [infectious] diseases caused by
biological agents and toxins;]
[(e) Assist States Parties in training personnel for employment in the
Organization, in order to promote the objective of representation on a wide
and equitable geographical basis;]
[(f) Conduct internship programmes, on the basis of equitable geographical
distribution, to optimize cooperation on the peaceful uses of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins and technical cooperation amongst the States
Parties;]
                                                
41United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/47 (Part I), 15 October 1999, Geneva.
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[(g) Promote the exchange, dissemination and the publication of information
on research centres, current research and training programmes and
conferences on the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of [infectious]
diseases caused by biological agents and toxins;]
(h) Provide information on the availability of and accessibility to publications
and other publicly available forms of information containing the results of
recent and current research programmes on the uses of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins for industrial, pharmaceutical, medical and
agricultural purposes [as well as developments in biodefence activities];
[(i) Implement programmes amongst States Parties on equipment and
technology exchanges relevant on the peaceful uses of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins;]
(j) Implement at the request of States Parties, programmes of support and
assistance for upgrading laboratories nominated for designation and
certification;
[(k) Implement programmes of support and assistance for designation and
certification.]
Cooperation and assistance in the context of visits
[18. If requested by a State Party and in the context of [randomly-selected]
[transparency] and [voluntary assistance] visits, provide information and advice on,
and implement where appropriate, any cooperation and assistance programme(s) of
the Organization in, inter alia:
(a) Biosafety, including environmental protection and occupational health
issues;
(b) The principles of Good Laboratory Practice and current Good
Manufacturing Practices;
[(c) [The identification of agents,] diagnostics and the [development of
innovative vaccines] [availability of existing vaccines and the possible
timetable for the introduction of new vaccines];]
(d) The principles and requirements of national and international regulatory
mechanisms governing the production, validation, marketing and sale of
pharmaceutical products and vaccines;
(e) Training requirements for facility and national regulatory personnel, and
sources of such training;
(f) The evaluation of the methodology underpinning the State Party’s or
facility’s declaration process and making suggestions, if necessary, for
methodological improvements to future declarations;
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(g) The provision of information, guidance or identifying any specific training
opportunities for facility personnel on efficient biosafety, occupational health
and safety practices and environmental protection relevant to the facility. This
may include facilitating contact with relevant international bodies;
(h) The provision of information on publications and other publicly available
forms of information containing current research programmes in the
biosciences and biotechnology, conferences, research centres, information
databases and other scientific and technological developments and activities
about which the visiting team are cognizant of relevance to the Convention
and facility;
(i) The provision of information and guidance as well as the identification of
any specific training opportunities for facility personnel to facilitate the
development, evaluation or licensing of products;
(j) The identification of national, regional and international sources of
information for more detailed follow-up enquiries and specialized assistance
on these topics.]
19. The Technical Secretariat shall either itself or in cooperation with States Parties
provide advice and assistance to States Parties, if requested, on:
(a) The establishment and functioning of national authorities;
(b) The preparation of declarations required under Article III of this Protocol;
(c) The drawing up of internal legislation necessary under the provisions of
this Protocol;
(d) The content and conduct of training courses and seminars for National
Authority and declared facility personnel on the compilation of declarations
and the planning and hosting of visits.
39.  These provisions in the draft BTWC Protocol are much more detailed -- and
understandably so given the emphasis in the Ad Hoc Group mandate on Article X of the
Convention as well as on compliance measures -- than the single corresponding paragraph in
the CWC Article XI Economic and Technological Development which simply states that:
1.  The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a manner which avoids
hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties, and
international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention including the international exchange of scientific
and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production,
processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
A Quantified Evaluation of the Protocol Regime
40.   The quantification of the overall Protocol regime can now be considered using the
OPCW information to provide a comparative baseline.   As noted previously in Briefing
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paper No 5, a lean and mean BTWC Protocol organization would be expected to have a
structure comprising:
Director-General
Administration
International Relations & Cooperation
Compliance Monitoring & Visits/Investigations
In the light of the developments over the past couple of years, the functions within the
structure would still be similar although the terminology might well be different so as to more
accurately reflect the emerging emphasis of the negotiations:
Director-General
Administration
International Cooperation & Assistance
Compliance Monitoring
41.  The essential technical expertise and capabilities would be embedded in the Organization
in the Divisions concerned with International Cooperation & Assistance and with Compliance
Monitoring.   By considering the requirements in the draft Protocol in the light of the
information available from the OPCW and elsewhere, it is possible to examine the
quantitative requirements for the implementation of the BTWC Protocol.   Each of the
principal elements of the regime are considered in turn.
42.   Declarations.   The numbers of declarations per developed European country will be in
the range of 10s.  Based on the UK data of 577 declarations to the OPCW, it is evident that
the number of declarations to the future BTWC Organization will be an order of magnitude
less -- and consequently present less of a burden on States Parties.    The total number of
estimated declarations to the future BTWC Organization remains at around 2500 assuming
160 States Parties and an average of about 15 declarations per State Party.   It is also apparent
that the Ad Hoc Group is paying attention devising clear and unambiguous declaration
formats.
43.  Follow-Up After Submission of Declarations.   The current Protocol text has language
that imposes a ceiling on the numbers of visits conducted each year "The total number of all
visits conducted pursuant to this Article shall not exceed [30][[75][140][...] in each
calendar year."  This is in contrast to the CWC which does not impose a ceiling on the
numbers of inspections carried out each year but controls this through the control by the
Conference of the States Parties of the annual OPCW Programme and Budget -- and
consequently has the flexibility to develop in the light of the experience gained by the OPCW
in the implementation of the CWC.
44.  For an effective and efficient regime, it is necessary to carry out sufficient randomly-
selected visits each year of all categories of declared facilities in order to ensure that the
declarations are both complete and accurate.   There will also be a need to carry out
declaration clarification procedures which could well benefit from the carrying out of a visit
to the facility concerned when it is recalled that the OPCW experience from its routine
inspections of Schedule 1, 2 and 3 facilities was that "the need for amended declarations was
the main issue requiring further attention."   Although there is currently still some concern
about visits carried out under declaration clarification procedures, it is probable that such
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concern will vanish once the future BTWC Organization comes into being and begins to carry
out its work implementing the Protocol.
45.  A useful comparison can be made of team size and duration for CWC routine inspections
under Article VI and for BTWC Protocol visits.   However, it needs to be recognised that the
general aim of CWC routine inspections are to verify that activities are consistent with the
information provided in declarations whereas the three types of BTWC Protocol have three
different aims.   The randomly-selected visits with the aim of confirming that declarations are
accurate and complete have the closest parallel to the CWC routine inspections.
CWC Regime Team size Duration Protocol Regime Team size Duration
Schedule 1 3 - 4 48 hours Randomly-selected 4 max† 2 days†
Schedule 2 5 96 hours* extension for
technical assistance
[1][3] days†
Schedule 3 5 24 hours* Clarification 4 max† 2 days†
DOC 24 hours* Voluntary assistance As agreed As agreed
* As specified in the Convention.  Extensions † As specified in the Protocol. The
   may be agreed between the inspection team and    duration of a randomly-selected
   the inspected State Party.    visit may be extended if the visited
   State Party and visiting team so agree.
The greater flexibility available under the OPCW regime is apparent.
46.  It is suggested that the different categories of facilities to be declared under the BTWC
Protocol should, as in the CWC regime, be subject to different frequencies of randomly-
selected visits reflecting the different risks posed to the Convention:
Category of Facility Frequency of randomly-selected visits
Converted past BW facilities in government ownership Most frequent
Current Defensive Programmes/ Activities Most frequent
Vaccine Production Facilities More frequent
Other Production Facilities More frequent
Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins Less frequent
Other Facilities Less frequent
High Biological Containment (BL-3) Facilities Least frequent
Maximum Biological Containment (BL-4) Facilities Least frequent
47.  In considering what these frequencies might be, it is useful to recall the CWC situation
for which the following frequencies can be deduced:
Category of Facility Frequency of inspections
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Chemical weapon production facility
closed or converted 2.5 per year on average
partially destroyed Once every two years
Schedule 1 chemical Once every eighteen months
Schedule 2 chemical Once every three years
Schedule 3 chemical ( 3 + 5% sites≤ 20*
DOCs (Discrete Organic Chemicals) ( 3 + 5% sites≤ 20*
* The number of inspections per year per State Party for plant sites producing
Schedule 3 chemicals or DOCs is a combined limit.  The Convention states in respect
of Schedule 3 plant sites that "the combined number of inspections shall not exceed
three plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a State Party under
both this Part and Part VIII of this Annex [the part relating to DOCs], or 20
inspections, whichever of these two figures is the lower."   Consequently, for a State
Party with a combined total of Schedule 3 and DOCs plant sites of 20, the limit would
be a total of  3 + 5% of 20 = 4 inspections.
48.  Some possible target frequencies for randomly-selected visits to the different categories
of facilities declared under the BTWC Protocol might be:
Category of Facility Frequency of randomly-selected visits
Converted past BW facilities in government ownership Once every eighteen months
Current Defensive Programmes/ Activities Once every eighteen months
Vaccine Production Facilities Once every three years
Other Production Facilities Once every three years
Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins Once every five years
Other Facilities Once every five years
High Biological Containment (BL-3) Facilities Once every ten years
Maximum Biological Containment (BL-4) Facilities Once every ten years
49.  Estimates can then be made for the numbers of visits required
Facilities Number of
 facilities*
Frequency
of visits
Visits per
year
Converted past BW facilities 20 Once/18 months 14
Biological defence facilities 43 Once/18 months 29
Vaccine production facilities 162 Once/three years 54
Other production facilities Once/three years
Work with listed agents Once/five years
Other facilities Once/five years
BL-3 facilities Once/ten years
BL-4 facilities 48 Once/ten years 5
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*  There is some limited information available about the number of facilities in some
of these categories from information submitted by States Parties under the CBMs
(Confidence Building Measures) agreed at the Second and Third Review
Conferences.42   It needs to be recognized that just over half of the States Parties have
made such declarations and the information provided is variable.   Nevertheless, in the
1997 declarations, some 43 facilities were declared as biodefence facilities: 32 were in
Western countries (19 in the USA), 1 in China, 1 in India, 9 in Russia.    Insofar as
BL-4 maximum containment facilities are concerned, 48 were declared in the 1997
declarations: 37 in Western countries, 1 in Belarus, 2 in Cuba, 2 in the Czech
Republic, 1 in Mongolia, 1 in Poland, 1 in Russia, 2 in the Slovak Republic, 1 in
South Africa.  Finally, in 1997, 162 vaccine production facilities were declared: 68 in
Western countries (11 in the USA, 11 in Japan, 10 in Spain, 9 in Italy..) and 94 in
other countries (19 in India, 16 in Russia, 8 in Brazil, 7 in Argentina, 7 in China, 7 in
South Korea...).
50.  It is evident that if it is assumed that there are globally 2,500 declared facilities, then such
frequencies would require more than 100 randomly-selected visits each year.  This analysis
shows the desirability of avoiding the specification of an upper limit in the BTWC Protocol
as such an arbitrary limit could result in forcing the regime to be less effective.  It would be
preferable to control the numbers of visits through the Conference of the States Parties
monitoring and approval of the annual programme and budget as well as the number of posts
within the future BTWC Organization.
51.  As noted in previous Briefing Papers, the number of clarification visits following
declaration clarification procedures can be expected to decrease with time after entry into
force of the Protocol as States Parties gain experience in making accurate and complete
declarations.   Likewise, voluntary assistance visits to provide assistance in making
declarations and implementing the Protocol can also be expected to decrease over time.  The
number of visits to provide technical assistance and cooperation can be expected to increase.
It is, however, desirable to build appropriate flexibility into the provisions for voluntary
assistance visits.  The current draft Protocol which, for example, limits the extension of
randomly-selected visits to "implement technical assistance and cooperation activities or
programmes as specified in Article VII, Section D, paragraph 17" is unnecessarily restrictive
-- a point which is illustrated by comparing the language in paragraph 17 of Section D with
that in paragraph 18 of Section D (which is headed Cooperation and assistance in the context
of visits) and appears much more relevant.  It would be preferable to simplify the reference to
"as specified in Article VII" and not specify specific sections or paragraphs.  Afterall, control
will be exercised by the Conference of the States Parties over the programme and budget of
the future BTWC Organization.
52.  As already noted, Article VII of the Protocol is considerably more developed than the
single paragraph in the corresponding Article of the CWC.   In the previous analysis of the
size of the BTWC Organization, it was assumed that the number of posts required for
international cooperation was the same as that for the OPCW:
OPCW Organization Number  Prospective BTWC Organization Number Change
                                                
42Iris Hunger, Article V: Confidence Building Measures, in Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando (eds),
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference, Department
of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 1996.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  Iris
Hunger, Private communication, November 1999, Max Delbruck Centre for Molecular Medicine, Berlin.
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International Cooperation &
Assistance
2 International Cooperation &
Assistance
2 ---
Assistance and Protection 5 Assistance and Protection 4 -1
International Cooperation 4 International Cooperation 4 ---
Total 11 Total 10 -1
The OPCW has found it necessary to increase the resources for the international cooperation
and assistance division by another 3 posts -- 2 for assistance and protection and 1 for
international cooperation -- to a total of 14.    It would be prudent, given the much wider
remit of Article VII of the Protocol, to make greater provision for the numbers for
International Cooperation & Assistance in the future BTWC Organization than in the OPCW.
A total of 15 to 20 is proposed, representing an increase of 5 to 10 posts.
Investigations
53.  The draft Protocol has well developed text for both field and facility investigations.  As
noted above, it is again preferable to build flexibility into the Protocol language leaving it to
the Director-General of the future BTWC Organization to determine the size of the
investigation team and select the proper qualified members.   The recent OPCW practice
investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons involved a team of 24.   This provides a
lower limit for the size of team required for a BTWC Protocol investigation as additional
skills may well be required for a BTWC investigation.  It is useful to recognize that in order
to guarantee a capability to be able to send a team of 24 to carry out an investigation at any
time, there needs to be a pool of  three times that number i.e. 72 from which to draw the team.
This larger pool is necessary because of annual leave, training, sickness and other factors
which prevent members of the pool from being available.   This pool of 72 is not something
which can safely be reduced because an investigation, should one be required, must be carried
out thoroughly and effectively as otherwise the Protocol regime will fall into disrepute.
Concluding Remarks
54.  This Briefing Paper has extended the analysis of the emerging Protocol regime in
Briefing Paper No 25 by examining how various aspects of the regime can be quantified.  The
CWC regime has again been used for comparative purposes, as it is the regime that is of the
closest relevance to the emerging BTWC Protocol regime.
55.   The quantified analysis has shown that the current draft Protocol is much more
restrictive than the CWC in numerous aspects.   It would be highly preferable to incorporate
flexibility into the Protocol now and thereby avoid the danger of arriving at a Protocol which
has been unnecessarily constrained and is unable to develop in the light of developments in
microbiology and biotechnology in the 21st century.   It needs to be recognized that the
Conference of the States Parties will have more than enough control over the programme and
budget of the future BTWC Organization.   The Protocol can with advantage address the
concepts and approaches to be adopted without specifying and limiting every detail.
56.  All categories of declared facilities need to be subjected to randomly-selected visits to
ensure that they are complete and accurate.  However, different categories of declared
facilities should be subjected to different frequencies of randomly-selected visits.
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57.  The frequency with which different categories of declared facilities should be subjected
to randomly-selected visits should reflect the risk to the Convention.  Consequently, past BW
facilities still within government ownership and biodefence facilities should be subject to the
most frequent randomly-selected visits whilst BL-4 maximum containment facilities should
be subject to the least frequent randomly-selected visits.  The target frequency for past BW
facilities and biodefence facilities could with advantage parallel that for Schedule 1 facilities
in the OPCW with a frequency of randomly-selected visits so that such facilities would be
visited once every eighteen months.
58.  The quantified examination indicates that the previous analysis of the size of the future
BTWC Organization remains largely correct.   The numbers of inspectors remains at about 70
-- a number necessary to enable investigations to be carried out at any time -- and the number
of visits -- randomly-selected, clarification and voluntary assistance -- remains at around 100
a year.  The number of posts required for International Cooperation & Assistance could
usefully be increased by 5 or 10 thus bring the total size of the future BTWC Organization to
about 220 which is still well under half the size of the OPCW which currently has 507 posts.
The budget for the future BTWC Organization continues to be some US $30 M about half
that of the OPCW, which in 2000 is 132 M NLG or approximately US $66 M.
59.   This quantified evaluation of the emerging Protocol has shown that an effective and
efficient regime is being developed.   Its size will be less than half and its budget half that of
the OPCW.  The frequency of randomly-selected visits should vary according to the category
of declared facility.  Care needs to be taken to build flexibility into the Protocol and avoid
unnecessary constraints as, after all, the Conference of the States Parties will control the
programme and budget of the future BTWC Organization.
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ANNEX:  ANALYSIS OF OPCW STAFF NUMBERS
(Based on Staff Numbers in reference43 as amended by reference44)
OPCW Organization Number  Prospective BTWC Organization Number Change
Director General 5 Director General 3 -2
Security 11 Security 2 -8
Office of Deputy Director-
General
5 -5
Health & Safety Branch 11 Health & Safety Branch 5 -6
Internal Oversight 6 Internal Oversight 2 -3
Office of Legal Adviser 4 Office of Legal Adviser 2 -2
Treaty Matters 3 Treaty Matters 1 -2
Internal Matters 2 Internal Matters 1 -1
Special Projects 2 -2
Subtotal 49 Subtotal 16 -33
Secretariat for Policy Making
Organs
3 Secretariat for Policy Making
Organs
2 -1
Conference Services Branch 3 Conference Services Branch 2 -1
Languages 23 Languages 18 -5
Conference Support 4 Conference Support 2 -2
Documentation 3 Documentation 2 -1
Total 85 Total 42 -43
Administration 2 Administration 2 ---
Budget & Finance 2 Budget & Finance 1 -1
Budget 3 Budget 1 -2
Accounts 3 Accounts 2 -1
Disbursement & Treasury 6 Disbursement & Treasury 2 -4
Human Resources Branch 2 Human Resources Branch 1 -1
Recruitment 3 Recruitment 1 -2
Staff Administration 7 Staff Administration 3 -4
Information Systems Branch 4 Information Systems Branch 2 -2
Network Systems 5 Network Systems 3 -2
Systems Application 7 Systems Application 3 -4
System Security 1 System Security 1 ---
Archives, Document management 7 Archives, Document management 3 -4
General Services Branch 2 General Services Branch 1 -1
Procurement 4 Procurement 1 -3
Travel & Transportation 7 Travel & Transportation 2 -5
Building/Facility Management 4 Building/Facility Management 1 -3
Training & Staff Development 4 Training & Staff Development 1 -3
Training Management 4 Training Management 1 -3
Total 77 Total 32 -45
                                                
43Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Technical Secretariat, Note by the Director-General:
Technical Secretariat:  Post Structure and Placements as of 8 September 1997,  Administration Division,
S/14/97, 11 September 1997.
44Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference of the States Parties, Programme and
Budget 1998,  Second Session, 1 - 5 December 1997, C-II/6, 6 December 1997.
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OPCW Organization Number  Prospective BTWC Organization Number Change
External Relations 2 External Relations 2 ---
Government Relations & Pol Aff 4 Government Relations & Pol Aff 2 -2
Media & Public Affairs 4 Media & Public Affairs 2 -2
Protocol 2 Protocol 2 ---
Visa 3 Visa 2 -1
Total 15 Total 10 -5
International Cooperation &
Assistance
2 International Cooperation &
Assistance
2 ---
Assistance and Protection 5 Assistance and Protection 4 -1
International Cooperation 4 International Cooperation 4 ---
Total 11 Total 10 -1
Verification Division 3 Verification Division 2 -1
Confidentiality 7 Confidentiality 7 ---
Declarations 2 Declarations 2 ---
Information Processing 8 Information Processing 6 -2
Information Validation 8 Information Validation 6 -2
Policy and Review 4 Policy and Review 3 -1
Evaluation 4 Evaluation 3 -1
Industry Verification 7 Industry Verification 7 ---
Chemical Demilitarization 7 Chemical Demilitarization --- -7
Technical Support Branch 4 Technical Support Branch 2 -2
OPCW Equipment Store 8 BTWCO Equipment Store 2 -6
OPCW Laboratory 4 BTWCO Laboratory 4 ---
Total 66 Total 44 -18
Inspectorate Division 2 Inspectorate Division 2 ---
Operations & Planning Centre 21 Operations & Planning Centre 6 -15
Inspection Management 3 Inspection Management 2 -1
Inspection Team Personnel 211 Inspection Team Personnel 60 -151
Total 237 Total 70 -167
OVERALL TOTAL 491 OVERALL TOTAL 208 -183
